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Abstract 
 
We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to 
develop a framework for explaining election-period decisions by credit rating 
agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk-ratings 
(“ratings”).  We test six hypotheses derived from the framework with 482 agency 
ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987-2000.  We find 
that ratings are linked to the partisan orientation of incumbents facing election and 
to expectations of incumbent victory.  Consistent with the framework, rating effects 
are sometimes greater for right-wing compared to left-wing incumbents, perhaps, 
because partisan PBC considerations with right-wing (left-wing) incumbents 
reinforce (counteract) opportunistic PBC considerations.   
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Democratization’s Risk Premium:  Partisan and Opportunistic Political 
Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries 
 
Non-Technical Summary 
 
This empirical study investigates the impact of developing country electoral politics on private, 
often foreign-based financial actors making decisions about risks associated with developing country 
lending and investment.  Since the 1970s, political business cycle (“PBC”) theory has been debated 
among academic researchers largely in the context of industrialized democracies and almost exclusively 
in the context of interactions among domestic political stakeholders, such as between elected incumbents 
and voters.  Early, so-called “opportunistic” PBC models posited opportunistic politicians using 
expansionary fiscal, monetary and related policies during elections to boost their chances of retaining 
office, even if such policies have detrimental economic consequences in the post-election period.  Later, 
so-called “partisan” PBC models also assumed that candidates championed economic policies for 
electoral purposes; however, their policies differed markedly with right-wing candidates characteristically 
emphasizing lower inflation, and left-wing candidates preferring lower unemployment.  Empirical 
researchers using PBC models have generally chosen either the opportunistic or the partisan branches, 
even though both may be relevant to explaining the behavior of individuals, firms and governments 
during election periods. 
 
Our paper differs in many ways from this previous stream of research.  We focus on the impact of 
PBC-related factors on private, foreign based financial actors rather than on domestic elected officials and 
voters.  We focus on developing countries where PBC-related factors are less studied rather than on 
industrialized countries.  Finally, we examine the PBC-related behaviors of private, foreign-based 
financial actors using both opportunistic and partisan PBC model assumptions, rather than choose one or 
the other branch of models. We do this in the context of major credit rating agencies (“agencies”) from 
the US, UK, and other industrialized countries.  Agencies provide advice to and certify the 
creditworthiness of borrowers from developing countries (e.g., Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & 
Poor’s).  Indeed, agencies facilitate credit transactions for developing country borrowers by publishing 
letter-grade sovereign risk ratings (“ratings”), commonly understood and relied on by capital market 
participants.  Previous research in international finance and economics shows that changes in their ordinal 
scales of creditworthiness ranging from “AAA” (very creditworthy) to “C” (great credit risk) can have 
significant short-term effects on market determined credit spreads for developing country debt 
instruments, market trading volume for which reached $2.8 trillion in 2000. 
   
Our study proposes that private, often foreign-based financial actors including agencies, care 
about such PBC-related considerations, and “vote” on the sovereign creditworthiness of developing 
countries during election periods based on such considerations.  To the extent that an incumbent’s pre-
election spending sprees or the likely electoral victor’s partisan economic policy choices are perceived by 
agencies to undermine sovereign financial commitments, election-period assessments of creditworthiness 
could become markedly less favorable with negative implications for the cost and availability of capital 
for the developing country.   
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We develop a conceptual framework for understanding how agency decisions may be shaped by partisan 
and opportunistic PBC considerations, and then derive and test several hypotheses from the framework, 
which is illustrated below: 
 
Predicted Directions of Election-Period Rating Changes by Agencies Based on Partisan and 
Opportunistic PBC Considerations 
 
Incumbent Partisan Orientation → 
Agency Electoral Expectation ↓ 
r (Right-Wing)  l (Left-Wing) 
 
Right-Wing Expected to Win 
 
 
(0,0) 
 
(+,-) 
 
Mixed Expectations 
 
 
(-,-) 
 
(+,-) 
 
Left-Wing Expected to Win 
 
 
(-,-) 
 
(0,0) 
 
  Predicted directions stated in each cell:  (Partisan, Opportunistic).   
 
Given the partisan orientation of the incumbent facing election (Right-Wing or Left-Wing), and 
given the expectations of his/her re-election at the time the agency does its annual rating review, we can 
predict the direction of any change in the agency rating using opportunistic and partisan PBC 
considerations.  We assume that right-wing incumbent policy preferences favor creditor interests (and 
thus induce better agency rating assessments).  If there is a right-wing incumbent facing election and 
expected to win, then there is likely to be no change in the agency rating (0,0):  From a partisan PBC 
perspective, current right-wing policies favorable to creditors are likely to continue after the election; 
from an opportunistic PBC perspective, the expectation of right-wing electoral victory puts little pressure 
on the incumbent to engage in pre-election spending sprees meant to buy votes, again assuaging the credit 
concerns of the agency.  Likewise, if there is a left-wing incumbent expected to win, both partisan and 
opportunistic considerations indicate no change in agency rating (0,0). 
 
Interestingly, though, the predicted direction of agency ratings during election periods differs for 
countries with right- versus left-wing incumbents once electoral expectations become mixed or it 
becomes clear that the challenger to the incumbent is likely to win.  For instance, with a right-wing 
incumbent, uncertainty regarding the eventual electoral outcome –what we call “mixed expectations”— 
or likely ouster by a left-wing candidate acts like a double negative pushing down agency ratings in 
election years (-,-):  From a partisan PBC perspective, the prospect of possible or likely partisan shift 
unfavorable to creditors will prompt an agency downgrade; from an opportunistic PBC perspective the 
possibility (mixed expectations) or expectation of left-wing victory is likely to prompt the right-wing 
incumbent to engage in a spending spree meant to buy votes and stave off electoral defeat, a prospect that 
also depresses agency ratings.  With left-wing incumbents, the predicted effects of partisan and 
opportunistic PBC considerations are not mutually reinforcing as in right-wing incumbent cases, but 
mutually counteracting.  When expectations of left-wing incumbent victory are unclear (mixed 
expectations) or if ouster by a right-wing challenger is likely then the PBC effects on agency ratings are 
both positive and negative (+,-):  From a partisan PBC perspective, the possibility or great likelihood of a 
partisan switch to creditor-friendly right-wing policies will positively affect agency ratings; from an 
opportunistic PBC perspective, however, the possibility or great likelihood of losing out to the right-wing 
challenger will prompt the left-wing incumbent to engage in a spending spree to buy votes, a prospect that 
will negatively affect agency ratings.  
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To test these predictions drawn from partisan and opportunistic PBC models, we collected data 
on 482 major agency ratings published by five major agencies (Moody’s, S&P, Duff Credit Ratings, 
Fitch-IBCA and Thomson BankWatch) for 19 developing country sovereigns holding 39 presidential 
elections from 1987-2000.  We analyzed these data in probit regression models that also included a range 
of control variables found in previous research to influence agency ratings.  Our regression analyses 
revealed substantial evidence consistent with our framework illustrated above.  We found significant 
negative effects on sovereign ratings for developing countries with right-wing incumbents facing left-
wing challengers likely to defeat them, or at least, likely to make it a “close call” for the right-wing 
incumbent on election day.  By contrast, election-period ratings did not fall significantly when the right-
wing incumbent was likely to be re-elected.  We also found that the magnitude of rating effects may at 
times be greater in absolute terms for right-wing versus left-wing incumbents.  This result is also 
important because it confirms in part our proposition that partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations 
tend to reinforce one another with right-wing incumbents, but tend to counteract one another in the case 
of left-wing incumbents.   
 
These results and others suggest to us that agencies behave consistently with partisan and 
opportunistic PBC considerations, and exact a risk premium on developing countries during election 
periods based on these considerations.  The changes in agency ratings we observed may, at first glance, 
seem small.  For example, we observed only a one-level drop in the 17-level ordinal scale (AAA = 16 to 
C = 0) agencies ordinarily use to assess sovereign creditworthiness during election years when right-wing 
incumbents were likely to lose to left-wing challengers.  But even a one-level drop in a developing 
country’s agency rating can be significant.  The average agency rating in our sample is very near the cut-
off between investment grade (BBB- = 7) and non-investment “junk” grade (BB+ = 6).  If electoral 
factors related to the opportunistic and partisan nature of competing political parties can move agency 
ratings even one level in this context –from junk to investment grade or vice versa-- they may have a 
substantial impact on the pricing and availability of capital for investment and development.   
 
We think our findings have substantial practical management and public policy implications as 
well as implications for academic researchers. First, PBC considerations and analytical models may have 
a substantial power in explaining the risk perceptions of agencies and, perhaps, other individuals (e.g., 
banks, multinational corporations, donor government agencies) involved in international capital pricing 
and allocation to the developing world.  Second, future research using PBC models should seek to 
integrate partisan and opportunistic PBC factors rather than treat one or the other in isolation.  Third, 
developing country governments and political parties more generally might benefit from more active 
engagement and dialog with agencies that otherwise show a tendency to penalize or reward countries with 
different ratings based on a rather simple set of PBC considerations.  Fourth, the agencies themselves, 
might benefit from closer examination of their rating processes and biases seemingly tied to PBC 
considerations.      
 
Such related issues are relevant, not only to the PBC literature as it is increasingly extended to 
developing countries, but also to broader issues of the relationship between democracy and growth.  
While in the long run, democracy undoubtedly is a good in itself, its long-term benefit may be offset by 
the short- to medium-term perception that competitive elections induce costly economic misbehavior of 
both partisan and opportunistic sorts.  To the extent that this perception increases the cost and reduces the 
supply of capital to developing countries, it imposes a “risk premium” on democracy that is still 
nonetheless worth paying. 
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1.  Introduction 
“Standard & Poor’s today lowered its long-term local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative 
Republic of Brazil…given the worsening domestic debt profile and heightened market concerns over political 
uncertainties…presently and after the October presidential elections…” 
 
Excerpt from Standard & Poor’s RatingsDirect, July 2, 2002 (Issued four months prior to October 2002 
presidential elections ousting the center-right incumbent Social Democratic Party and electing leftist 
Worker’s Party candidate Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva) (S&P, 2002) 
 
This study investigates the impact of developing country electoral politics on private, often 
foreign-based financial actors making decisions about risks associated with developing country lending 
and investment.  Since the seminal papers of Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte (1978), 
political business cycle (“PBC”) theory has been debated largely in the context of industrialized 
democracies and almost exclusively in the context of interactions among domestic political stakeholders, 
such as between elected incumbents and voters.  These original models, as well as more recent models 
developed by Rogoff and Siebert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) posited opportunistic politicians using 
expansionary fiscal, monetary and related policies during elections to boost their chances of retaining 
office, even if such policies have detrimental economic consequences in the post-election period.  PBC 
models developed by Hibbs (1977, 1987), Alesina (1987; 1988), Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000b) 
also suggest that candidates champion economic policies for electoral purposes; however, their policies 
differ markedly with right-wing candidates characteristically emphasizing lower inflation, and left-wing 
candidates preferring lower unemployment.   
While a substantial stream of empirical studies from the US and other industrialized democracies 
has yielded a mixed bag of supporting and contrary results regarding both these opportunistic and partisan 
PBC behaviors, recent reviews of PBC research in Alesina and Roubini (1997), Drazen (2000a, b), 
Franzese (2002) and others (e.g., Block and Vaaler, 2003) indicate that there has been much less 
empirical testing to date in developing country settings.  Research in these settings has been largely in the 
opportunistic rather than partisan PBC branch, and focused on explanation of domestic interactions 
between elected officials and election policies on the one hand and voters on the other hand.    
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Yet, PBCs of a partisan or opportunistic nature may also have important implications for various 
foreign-based actors crucial to developing country investment and economic growth.  For example, major 
credit rating agencies (“agencies”) from the US, UK, and other industrialized countries provide advice to 
and certify the creditworthiness of borrowers from developing countries.  Indeed, agencies facilitate credit 
transactions for developing country borrowers by publishing letter-grade sovereign risk ratings 
(“ratings”), commonly understood and relied on by capital market participants.  Studies by Cantor and 
Packer (1996a; 1996b), Larraín et al. (1997), and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) show that changes in 
this 17-point ordinal scale of letter grades ranging from virtually no (16 = AAA) to great (0 = C) credit 
risk
1 can have significant short-term effects on market determined credit spreads for developing country 
debt instruments, market trading volume for which reached $2.8 trillion in 2000 (EMTA, 2000).   
In this context, it is interesting that partisan and opportunistic PBC lenses have only occasionally 
been applied to developing countries, and then, almost never to explain interactions between politicians 
and non-voting constituencies.  Arguably, competitive democratic elections potentially prompting both 
partisan and opportunistic PBC behaviors could substantially affect not only voters but also other 
individuals, including those involved in allocation and pricing capital for investment and development.  
As Goldsmith (1994) notes, development of competitive democratic electoral systems was thought by 
many to promote greater stability and, in turn, enhance long-term attractiveness for lending and 
investment purposes.  On the other hand, the prospects of excessive opportunism prior to voting and 
adverse partisan policies after the vote could leave the country with a much less attractive profile for 
creditors and investors, at least in the short- to medium-term. 
Our study proposes that private, often foreign-based financial actors including agencies, care 
about such PBC-related considerations, and “vote” on the sovereign creditworthiness of developing 
                                                      
1 In terms of the two most prominent agencies, Moody’s Investor Service (“Moody’s”) and Standard & Poor’s Rating Services  
(“S&P”), these 17 ordinal levels are:  Aaa for Moody’s (AAA for S&P) = 16; Aa1 (AA+) = 15; Aa2 (AA) = 14; Aa3 (AA-) = 13; 
A1 (A+) = 12; A2 (A) = 11; A3 (A-) = 10; Baa1 (BBB+) = 9; Baa2 (BBB) = 8; Baa3 (BBB-) = 7; Ba1 (BB+) = 6; Ba2 (BB) = 5; 
Ba3 (BB-) = 4; B1 (B+) = 3; B2 (B) = 2; B3 (B-) = 1; and C (C) = 0.  Other major US and overseas agencies rating sovereigns 
during the 1990s (e.g., UK-based International Bank Credit Analysis, Canada/US-based Thomson Bank Watch, and US-based 
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countries during election periods based on such considerations.  To the extent that an incumbent’s pre-
election spending sprees or the likely electoral victor’s partisan economic policy choices are perceived by 
agencies to undermine sovereign financial commitments, election-period assessments of creditworthiness 
could become markedly less favorable with negative implications for the cost and availability of capital 
for the developing country. 
We develop a conceptual framework for understanding how agency decisions may be shaped by 
partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations, and then derive six hypotheses from the framework. 
Regression analysis of 482 agency ratings for 19 developing country sovereigns holding 39 presidential 
elections from 1987-2000, reveals substantial evidence consistent with our framework.  We find 
significant negative effects on sovereign ratings for developing countries with right-wing incumbents 
facing left-wing challengers likely to defeat them, or at least, make it a “close call” for the right-wing 
incumbent on election day.  By contrast, election-period ratings do not fall significantly when the right-
wing incumbent is likely to be re-elected.  We also find that the magnitude of rating effects may at times 
be greater in absolute terms for right-wing versus left-wing incumbents.  As we explain below, these 
distinctions may be because partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations tend to reinforce one another 
with right-wing incumbents, but tend to counteract one another in the case of left-wing incumbents.  
These results and others suggest that agencies behave consistently with partisan and opportunistic PBC 
considerations, and exact a risk premium on developing countries during election periods based on these 
considerations.  
The remainder of this study is divided into five additional sections.  Section 2 describes the 
relevant theory and empirical findings for opportunistic and partisan PBCs applied to traditional 
incumbent government-domestic voter interactions, and to interactions with the private financial actors of 
central interest in this research.  Section 3 summarizes our conceptual framework for analyzing agency 
rating decisions using partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations, and six framework-derived 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Fitch Investor Services and Duff & Phelp’s Credit Rating Company) use letter-rankings similar to S&P’s.  For more on agency 
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hypotheses for empirical investigation.  Section 4 describes the methodology for testing these six 
hypotheses.  Section 5 presents descriptive and regression analysis results using various specifications.  
Section 6 concludes by discussing the findings’ implications for partisan and opportunistic PBC research 
and policy.   
2.  Research Background 
Opportunistic and Partisan PBC Theory 
Traditional partisan PBC models originated with Hibbs (1977, 1987), who argued that politicians 
seeking election tended to adopt economic policies according to ideological preferences.  His explanation 
distinguished the partisan branch of PBC research from an opportunistic branch originating in Nordhaus 
(1975, 1989), who contended that election-period economic policy choices were based more on the 
general support they would generate from voters with homogenous preferences.  While early models 
assumed naïve voters with adaptive expectations and capabilities to anticipate incumbent policies during 
election periods, models developed later by Rogoff and Siebert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) posited voters 
with rational expectations and relative ease at anticipating election-period spending sprees by politicians.   
According to traditional partisan PBC models, incumbents again use economic policy to garner 
voter support, but based on their partisan political orientation, they will prefer economic policies with 
different emphases to accomplish this end.  In terms of a simple Phillips curve approach, left-wing 
incumbent policies will tend to favor employment at the expense of inflation, while right-wing incumbent 
policies favor inflation at the expense of employment.  Because voter preferences are assumed to be 
heterogeneous based on these types of partisan preferences, such policy differences can generate 
substantial differences in political support during election periods, substantial differences in employment, 
inflation and economic growth after elections, and substantial right-left partisan swings across several 
election periods (Drazen 2000b).   
                                                                                                                                                                           
ratings and the industrial organization of the sovereign rating business see, e.g., White (2001).  
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Alesina (1987; 1988) and others (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1993) refined traditional partisan 
PBC models to be consistent with rational-expectations assumptions.  So-called rational partisan cycle 
(“RPC”) models assume a less exploitable Phillips curve compared to traditional partisan PBC models.  
Thus, Alesina et al. (1997) argue that the main difference between traditional partisan PBC and RPC 
models is that real effects of partisan shifts in government tend to persist in traditional models but is 
temporary in rational models.   
Empirical Evidence of Opportunistic and Partisan PBCs 
Recent reviews of the PBC research chronicle a growing empirical literature, but with more 
growth in the opportunistic rather than partisan PBC branches, and with much more work in both 
branches in industrialized country rather than developing country contexts.  While evidence supporting 
opportunistic PBCs in industrialized countries is, to date, mixed, empirical studies in developing countries 
consistently find support for the proposition that incumbents may employ expansionary monetary, fiscal 
and related policies during election periods to gain voter support on the final election day.
 2  Schuknecht 
(1999), for example, finds evidence of electioneering in the form of expansionary fiscal policies during 
electoral campaigns for several developing countries with fixed exchange rate regimes from the 1970s to 
the early 1990s.  Block (2002) also finds evidence of opportunistic behavior in the fiscal and monetary 
policies in a sample of African countries covering the 1980s and 1990s.  Block and Vaaler (2003) find 
that the prospect of such electioneering in developing countries may explain agency downgrades in 
sovereign ratings, and increases in market determined spreads on sovereign bonds in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Our literature review finds only sparse application of partisan PBC theory in non-industrialized 
democracies, and practically nothing applying to interactions between politicians and private actors.  
Imbeau’s (2001) meta-study illustrates the mainstream of partisan PBC research to date:  An examination 
of 693 cross-sectional estimates from 43 different studies of left-right party impact on policy in OECD 
                                                      
2 By “final election day” we mean the date or dates of the general election, or in the case of multiple electoral rounds, the date or 
dates of the run-off election.  For the remainder of this study, we use the terms “election day” to refer to this final election day 
concept.  
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countries yields some conflicting results, but overall strong evidence of partisan cycles fiscal, monetary 
and related policies in multivariate studies for periods after 1973.   
In moving from politician-voter to politician-private actor interactions, the population of partisan 
PBC empirical research thins considerably.  Alesina et al. (1997) study the effects on US bond forward 
rates related to the probability of Democrat (left-wing) versus Republican (right-wing) presidential 
victories from 1948 to 1988:  Increases in the probability of Democrat victory on election day are 
associated with higher forward rates compared to favorable changes in the electoral prospects of 
Republican presidential candidates.  On the other hand, evidence from Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) 
suggests that US stock market returns in the post-World War II period have actually been higher under 
Democrat rather than Republican governments.  Bachman’s results (1992) link changes in bias in forward 
exchange rates to changes in government, though follow-on work by Bernhard and Leblang (2002) finds 
no significant link between bias in forward exchange rates and either the partisan orientation of the 
government or change in partisan orientation.   
As we further refine the search for previous research using partisan PBC models to explain 
politician-private actor interactions in developing countries, we find only Leblang’s (2002) recent study 
on the likelihood of speculative attacks on developing country currencies during election periods.  He 
found that they were more likely during election periods with left- rather than right-wing incumbents, and 
more likely in the post- rather than pre-election period.  Though only a single study about a single group 
of private actors, Leblang’s results suggest that partisan PBC perspectives may have relevance for more 
than just currency traders assessing developing country vulnerability to speculative currency attacks.  
Political trends in developing countries fostering democratization and PBCs on the one hand, and 
economic trends increasing private lending and investment on the other hand, no doubt implicate a much 
broader group of private actors, including agencies.  
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3.  Empirical Background, Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
Agency Rating Decisions and PBC Considerations:  A Conceptual Framework 
Agency sovereign risk assessment and rating publication processes tend to be discrete, deliberate, 
costly and, therefore, infrequent process that may not occur simultaneously with developments materially 
affecting a given risk assessment.
3  In the case of elections, this means that agencies must often resort to 
forecasting likely outcomes days, weeks or even months before election day.  Indeed, even when the 
initial rating or review process coincides or immediately follows election day, there may yet be residual 
uncertainty as to the final victor (e.g., US presidential election in November 2000) and the victor’s ability 
to implement policies advocated on the campaign trail.  In sum, agencies often have to forecast likely 
electoral outcomes and policies against the backdrop of uncertainty. 
Our fundamental research proposition is that considerations linked to PBC opportunism and 
partisanship may enter significantly into agency risk assessments made during election periods with 
varying degrees of uncertainty.  To illustrate this proposition and to generate hypotheses for empirical 
investigation, we develop below a conceptual framework for agency decision-making drawing on both 
partisan and opportunistic PBC theoretical perspectives.   
Consider an agency conducting an annual review of a developing country’s sovereign rating 
during an election period.  This review could occur at any time during the election period, but for 
purposes of clarifying our framework, assume that it occurs at time t = 0, just before the election 
campaign begins.  The election campaign takes place during time t = T-.  Election day is at time t = T, and 
                                                      
3 As Cantor and Packer (1994) and others (e.g., McNamara & Vaaler, 2002) have pointed out, sovereigns generally invite an 
agency to give a rating in order to provide investors with credible information about capability and willingness to honor financial 
commitments, to enhance financial transparency, and to facilitate placement of debt, particularly with US institutional investors.  
An initial rating process can last from several weeks to several months and involve substantial costs to the agency.  Teams of 
from three to seven analysts are engaged in data collection, interviews and analysis both at the agency and in-country.  Senior 
executives review analyst reports, decide on provisional ratings, handle “appeals” from representatives of the sovereign, and then 
publish final ratings.  Since initial ratings are frequently completed with an actual securities offering, agencies are often 
compensated with a percentage of the offering’s face amount, which can run as high as 2-3%.  Once published, ratings are subject 
to regular review, usually on an annual or a semi-annual basis, unless material, unexpected developments require an 
extraordinary review.  Regular or extraordinary reviews tend to be summary versions of the original rating process, involving 
several agency analysts, senior executives, and sometimes, representatives from the rated sovereign. 
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the subsequent post-election period is t = T+, when the winning candidate will then seek to implement 
various economic policies materially affecting sovereign creditworthiness: 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Agency Rating Review and Election Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further assume that the agency conducting this review is concerned with partisan and 
opportunistic PBC considerations influencing overall sovereign risk.  In that case, its decision rule 
regarding a recommendation either to upgrade, downgrade, or maintain the current sovereign risk rating 
can be summarized as: 
(1)  ( ) l r i R R f R
O
i
P
i
O P
i , , , 0 , 0
,
, 0 = ∆ ∆ = ∆  
where  0 R ∆  is the change in the agency rating at time t = 0, the superscripts (P, O) indicate respectively 
the change with respect to partisan or opportunistic PBC considerations, and the subscripts (r, l) define 
respectively whether the incumbent is from a right-wing or a left-wing party. 
The Partisan Dimension 
  Consider first the partisan dimension, 
P
i R , 0 ∆ .  Assume that the agency’s decision rule for partisan 
considerations takes the form: 
(2)  ( ) i
e
T
P
i g R π π − − = ∆ + , 0  
t = 0 t = T- t = T t = T+
Pre-Election Period Post-Election Period
Agency Analyst’s
Pre-Election Rating
Change 
Recommendation
Election Day 
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where  i π  is the inflation rate at time t = 0 for incumbent from party i, 
e
T+ π  is the expected inflation rate in 
the post-election period (T+), and  ) (⋅ g is a step function that translates the continuous difference within 
the function into discrete changes in agency rating.  Equation (2) assumes that the greater the difference 
between expected post-election inflation and the current inflation imposed by party i, the larger the 
downgrade at t = 0.  A fundamental assumption of partisan PBC theory is that right-wing incumbents are 
willing to suffer higher unemployment for the sake of lower inflation, while left-wing incumbents impose 
the opposite preferences.  We thus assume that  l r π π < .  We further adopt the implication of traditional 
partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977) that parties are able to impose their preferences over inflation throughout 
their tenure.
4  This implies in our context that  i i T i T i t π π π π = = = + − = , , , 0 .  Expected post-election 
inflation (
e
T+ π ) is thus an average weighted by the agency’s subjective probability (λ) that the right-wing 
party will win on election day: 
 
(3)  1 0 ) 1 ( ≤ ≤ − + = + λ π λ λπ π for l r
e
T  
  Substituting (3) into (2) yields the agency’s decision rule with respect to partisan considerations: 
 
(4)  [] () i l r
P
i g R π π λ λπ − − + − = ∆ ) 1 ( , 0  
The implications of this decision rule depend on which party is incumbent.  For right-wing 
incumbents (i = r), as  0 → λ ,  l
e
T π π → +  and  17 , 0 − → ∆ P
i R (i.e., the agency chooses to downgrade, with 
                                                      
4 This choice lies in contrast to RPC theory (Alesina, 1987), which assumes incumbents are able to impose their inflationary 
preferences only during the first half of the tenure.  Our choice in this regard rests on our focus on developing countries, many of 
which are nascent democracies in which voters may be less experienced and or may have less-efficient means of implementing 
strategies anticipating likely partisan policies.  In any case, voters in these countries may not meet the requirements of “rational” 
voters in the formal sense.  This distinction has been defined by whether voters vote retrospectively (e.g., whether they reward 
incumbents based on recent rather than expected future economic performance).  It therefore seems reasonable to assume that 
“new” voters in developing countries may exhibit retrospective voting patterns, particularly in light of evidence of retrospective 
voting even in the U.S. (Fair, 1978, 1982, 1988).  While retrospective voting can be “rational” (Rogoff, 1990), we assert that on 
balance, traditional retrospective voting best characterizes the “typical” voter in developing countries.  
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greater differences between expected and current inflation bringing greater downgrades).
5  In the limiting 
case of the certain retention of a right-wing incumbent (λ = 1), expected inflation equals current inflation 
and  0 , 0 = ∆
P
r R  (i.e., the agency retains its current rating at time t = 0).  That is, if there is any substantial 
chance of a right-wing incumbent losing to a left-wing candidate, the agency expects increased inflation 
in the post-election period and, thus, tends toward a downgrade.  In this context, the “best” case scenario 
from the agency’s perspective is the certain retention of a right-wing incumbent, in which case expected 
inflation equals current inflation, and the agency maintains the current rating.  Note that partisan 
considerations exclude upgrades for right-wing incumbents during election periods. 
For left-wing incumbents (i = l), as  1 → λ ,  r
e
T π π → +  and  17 , 0 → ∆ P
i R  (i.e., the agency upgrades, 
increasingly so as expected inflation falls further below current inflation).  In the limiting case of the 
certain retention of a left-wing incumbent (λ = 0), expected inflation equals current inflation and 
0 , 0 = ∆
P
l R  (i.e., the agency retains its current rating at t = 0).  That is, if there is any substantial chance of 
a right-wing candidate replacing a left-wing incumbent, expected inflation must be lower than current 
inflation, and the agency tends toward an upgrade.  The “worst” case scenario from the agency’s 
perspective is the certain retention of a left-wing incumbent, in which case expected inflation equals 
current inflation, and the agency again maintains the current rating.  Note that partisan considerations 
exclude downgrades for left-wing incumbents during election periods. 
The Opportunistic Dimension 
So far, our agency decision rule has relied on PBC considerations of an exclusively partisan 
nature.  Opportunistic PBC theory rests on the assumption that incumbents are identical with respect to 
policy preferences.  In this case, there is no distinction between inflation under right-wing and left-wing 
incumbents.  We assert in this case simply that if an incumbent of either party faces a low probability of 
re-election, she will be motivated to act opportunistically in the pre-election period.  Opportunistic PBC 
                                                      
5 Recall that ratings are commonly expressed in terms of a 17-point scale running from 16 (“AAA”) to 0 (“C”).  A change of 17 
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theory (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff, 1990) predicts she will be more likely to engage in expansionary 
fiscal, monetary and related policies in an effort to generate votes.  Theory further suggests that such 
“spending spree” policies are often financed by increased inflation in the post-election period.  Schultz 
(1995) demonstrates that when incumbents trail in pre-election polls they are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior than when they enjoy a solid lead in the polls.  Block and Vaaler (2003) apply 
opportunistic PBC perspectives to explain why ratings for developing country sovereigns trend negatively 
in election years.  Together, these results suggest that agencies may take rating decisions in light of both 
partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations related to likely electoral outcomes. 
  Consider now the opportunistic dimension, 
O
i R , 0 ∆ .  Assume in this case that the agency’s decision 
rule takes the form: 
(5)  ( ) i
e
i T
O
i h R , 0 , , 0 π π − − = ∆ +  
where  ) (⋅ h is a step function (though not necessarily identical to  ) (⋅ g ) that translates differences of the 
bracketed term into discrete changes in agency ratings.  As before, expected inflation is an average 
weighted by the λ, yet in the opportunistic case the difference between expected post-election inflation 
and inflation at t = 0 is not a function of party.  We assert simply that for either party, post-election 
inflation will exceed inflation at t = 0 if the incumbent’s “back is against the wall” ( 0 ≅ λ  for a right-
wing incumbent,  1 ≅ λ  for a left-wing incumbent).
6 
  In this context, expected inflation may be expressed as: 
 
(6) 
 



= − +
= − +
=
+
+
+
l i if
r i if
i i
i i e
i T
, 0
, 0
,
) 1 (
) 1 (
π λ λπ
π λ λπ
π  
                                                                                                                                                                           
rating levels in either direction thus defines the maximum possible change in our framework. 
6 Thus, despite the absence of partisanship in opportunistic models, consistency in the definition of λ requires the 
inclusion of the party subscript (i) in equation (5). 
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where  i i , 0 π π >
+ .  This expression indicates that for a given party, the expectation of losing motivates 
opportunistic behavior and engenders higher post-election inflation than observed at t = 0.  In the case of 
the certain retention of a right-wing incumbent, λ = 1, there is no substantial incentive to spend 
opportunistically during the election period.  In that case, expected post-election inflation should be 
unchanged from current inflation at t = 0.  This is also true for left-wing incumbents when λ = 0. 
  Substituting (6) into (5) yields the agency’s decision rule with respect to opportunistic 
considerations: 
(7)   ()
() 







− − +
− − +
− = ∆
+
+
l l l
r r r O h R
, 0 , 0
, 0 , 0
0
) 1 (
) 1 (
π π λ λπ
π π λ λπ
 
 
As with the partisan dimension, the implications of this decision rule based on opportunistic 
considerations depend on which party is incumbent.  For right-wing incumbents, this decision rule 
indicates that as  0 → λ , 
+
+ → r
e
r T π π ,  and   17 , 0 − → ∆ P
i R  (i.e., the agency tends to downgrade in increasing 
magnitude with the subjective probability of the left-wing challenger replacing the right-wing incumbent).  
In the limiting case of λ = 1, expected inflation equals current inflation and  0 0 = ∆
O R  (i.e., the agency 
retains its current rating at t = 0).  If there is any chance of the incumbent losing, opportunistic 
considerations suggest higher post-election inflation than at t = 0, and the agency tends towards 
downgrade.  In the “best” case scenario (λ = 1 when i = r), there is again no incentive for the right-wing 
incumbent to behave opportunistically and the agency maintains the current rating.  Precisely the same 
logic pertains for left-wing incumbents:  as  1 → λ , 
+
+ → l
e
l T π π .  and  17 , 0 − → ∆ P
i R .  In the limiting case, 
0 0 0 = ∆ ⇒ =
O R λ . 
Equation (1) requires that these partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations be merged to 
determine the agency’s overall decision regarding sovereign risk during election periods.  Table 1 
summarizes our predictions of how the agency will react under various circumstances as defined above.   
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In each case, Table 1 indicates whether partisan and opportunistic considerations reinforce or counteract 
one another.  The pair (P, O) in each cell indicates, respectively, whether the partisan and opportunistic 
considerations call for an upgrade (+), downgrade (-), or maintenance of the status quo (0). 
TABLE 1 
Predicted Directions of Election-Period Rating Changes by Agencies Based on Partisan and 
Opportunistic PBC Considerations 
 
Incumbent Partisan Orientation → 
Agency Electoral Expectation ↓ 
r (Right-Wing)  l (Left-Wing) 
 
λ = 1 (Right-Wing Expected to Win) 
 
 
(0,0) 
 
(+,-) 
 
0 < λ < 1 (Mixed Expectation) 
 
 
(-,-) 
 
(+,-) 
 
λ = 0 (Left-Wing Expected to Win) 
 
 
(-,-) 
 
(0,0) 
   
  Predicted directions stated in each cell:  (Partisan, Opportunistic). 
 
 
  It is interesting to note that for right-wing incumbents, our framework suggests that partisan and 
opportunistic considerations reinforce one another; yet, except when a left-wing victory is certain, for left-
wing incumbents these considerations work in opposition to one another.  In those cells of Table 1 where 
the pair is (0,0), we predict no significant change in ratings during an election year.  In those cases where 
the pair is (-,-) we predict a significant downgrade.  In those cells where the pair is (+,-), the outcome is 
ambiguous a priori, and will depend empirically on whether agency decisions are dominated (perhaps 
systematically) by partisan or opportunistic PBC considerations. 
  Two modifications to the predictions in Table 1 help transform them into testable hypotheses.  
The first modification practically operationalizes λ, which would rarely, if ever, equal exactly 0 or 1 in 
any competitive electoral system (to which we limit our sample below).  We do not directly observe 
subjective assessments by agencies regarding the probability of a right-wing victory.  For purposes of our 
study, we instead construct λ based on the assumption that agencies are able to predict with reasonable  
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accuracy the outcomes of elections when elections are not close.
7  With this assumption, we infer that 
hi λ λ =  in either of two scenarios:  There was a right-wing incumbent who won by a large margin; or 
there was a left-wing incumbent who lost by a large margin.  As described in greater detail below, we 
define a “large” margin to be an election outcome in which the winner’s vote share exceeds the loser’s by 
more than 3%.  Similarly, we infer that 
lo λ λ =  in either of two alternative scenarios:  There was a right-
wing incumbent who lost by a large margin; or there was a left-wing incumbent who won by a large 
margin.  In the final two scenarios, the margin of victory for right- or left-wing incumbent was not large.  
In these scenarios, λ = λ
med. 
A second modification to the results in Table 1 characterizes the relative magnitude of predicted 
outcomes as a function of λ.  Given the opposing effects of partisan and opportunistic considerations 
under left-wing incumbents, the magnitude of our expected rating changes is not merely a function of λ.  
Indeed, as we have no a priori basis for asserting that either partisan or opportunistic considerations 
would systematically dominate the other, it is reasonable to conjecture that they will approximately cancel 
one another, leading to no change in rating.  Thus, we predict that agencies will tend not to change ratings 
during election periods when the incumbent is left-wing. 
In contrast, given a right-wing incumbent, our framework predicts a clear link between 
expectation of election-day victory and agency rating, since both partisan and opportunistic 
considerations are mutually reinforcing.  Thus, for a “high” probability of a right-wing victory (λ
hi ) we 
predict little, if any, downgrade pressure; here the probability of a right-wing victory is low (λ
lo ) the 
downgrade will exceed in magnitude the downgrade issued when the election is a close call (λ
med ). 
With these two modifications to the predictions in Table 1, we hypothesize first about the overall 
sign and size of election-period rating changes given left- and right-wing incumbents as follows: 
                                                      
7  Ideally, we would have regular polling data from each country for each election in our sample.  As such data are unavailable to 
us, we are effectively making the assumption that those polling data were available to agencies at the time, and that they formed 
their subjective probabilities based on those polls.  We are thus “seeing” the polling data retroactively through agency eyes.  
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H1:  Given left-wing incumbents, agencies tend not to change election-period ratings, 
regardless of the likelihood of re-election (i.e.,  0 ,
, 0
,
, 0
,
, 0 ≅ ∆ ≅ ∆ ≅ ∆ = = =
lo med hi
O P
l
O P
l
O P
l R R R λ λ λ λ λ λ ). 
 
H2:  Given right-wing incumbents, agencies tend not to downgrade election-period ratings if 
re-election is likely, but do tend to issue downgrades if re-election is less likely
 (i.e., 
0 , 0 , 0 ,
, 0
,
, 0
,
, 0 < ∆ < ∆ ≅ ∆ = = =
lo med hi
O P
r
O P
r
O P
r R R R λ λ λ λ λ λ ). 
 
H3:  Given right-wing incumbents, election-period downgrades tend to be greater as the 
probability of re-election decreases (i.e.,  lo med hi
O P
r
O P
r
O P
r R R R λ λ λ λ λ λ = = = ∆ < ∆ < ∆ ,
, 0
,
, 0
,
, 0 ). 
 
These first three hypotheses focus on election-period ratings related to differences in agency 
electoral expectations given a particular incumbent partisan orientation.  Table 1 also suggests hypotheses 
about election-period ratings related to differences in incumbent partisan orientation given a particular 
agency electoral expectation.  We state three such hypotheses for testing below.  Each compares the 
absolute magnitude of election-period rating changes for right- versus left-wing incumbents given a 
particular agency electoral expectation: 
H4:  The absolute magnitude of election-period rating changes for right-wing incumbents 
expected to lose is greater than the absolute magnitude of such changes (if any) for left-
wing incumbents expected to lose (i.e., 
hi lo
O P
l
O P
r R R
λ λ λ λ = =
∆ > ∆ ,
, 0
,
, 0 ). 
 
H5:  The absolute magnitude of election-period rating changes for right-wing incumbents 
expected to be re-elected is approximately equal to the absolute magnitude of such 
changes for left-wing incumbents expected to be re-elected 
(i.e, 0 ,
, 0
,
, 0 ≅ ∆ ≅ ∆
= =
lo hi
O P
l
O P
r R R
λ λ λ λ
). 
 
H6:  The absolute magnitude of election-period rating changes for right-wing incumbents in 
“close call” elections is greater than the absolute magnitude of such changes (if any) for 
left-wing incumbents in “close call” elections (e.g.,  ). ,
, 0
,
, 0 med med
O P
l
O P
r R R
λ λ λ λ = =
∆ > ∆  
 
4. Methodology 
Ratings Model and Hypothesis Tests 
To test these six hypotheses, we specify an empirical model of agency ratings based on general 
rating factors commonly used by the agencies, and on specific election-period rating factors drawn from 
our conceptual framework:  
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rit it it it it it
it it it it j it j
t t t i i r r rit
RINC ELEC ELEC
RINC ELEC RINC ELEC MACRO
YEAR COUNTRY AGENCY RATING
µ λ β λ β
β β β ψ
ξ γ α β
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + + =
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
=
= = =
) * *   D ( ) * D (
) * (
5 4
3 2 1
7
1
1999
1988
18
1
4
1 0
 (8)   
In (8) the dependent variable, RATING, is the 17-level sovereign risk-rating on long-term foreign 
currency denominated debt published by agency r for sovereign from developing country i on December 
31 of each year t from 1987 to 2000.  Since RATING is the final assessment from the agency’s 
characteristically annual review of macroeconomic and related factors shaping the long-term sovereign 
risk, it relies largely on macroeconomic and related data with approximately annual periodicity.  
After including dummy variables to control for unobserved and possibly idiosyncratic effects 
related to AGENCY, COUNTRY, and YEAR in Equation (8), we next include seven macroeconomic and 
related controls variables, MACRO, for country i in year t.  Final data on these seven terms may be 
published in year t only after the agency has completed its rating review.  Agencies may have only 
forecast data for year t but complete and verifiable data for the previous year, t-1.  Taking this possibility 
into account, we formulate measures for each of the seven as 2-year averages based on year t and the 
previous year t-1 observations.   
These seven macroeconomic control variables, for which ψ are parameter estimates, include: 1) 
Per capita income (PCI) measured in thousands of constant (1995) US dollars and expected to be 
positively related to RATING; 2) Economic growth (GDPG) measured as the average annual real GDP 
growth rate and expected to be positively related to RATING; 3) Inflation (INF) measured as the average 
annual consumer price inflation and expected to be negatively related to RATING; 4) Fiscal balance 
(FISCBAL) measured as the average annual overall budget balance relative to GDP and expected to be 
positively related to RATING; 5) External balance (EXTBAL) measured as the average current account 
balance relative to GDP and expected to be positively related to RATING; 6) External debt per GDP 
(EXTDEBT) measured as the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term 
debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt divided by GPD and expected to be negatively related to  
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RATING
8; and 7) Recent default indicator (DEF5) measured as a 0-1 indicator (1 if in default; 0 
otherwise), indicating whether the sovereign has defaulted on either its domestic- or foreign-currency 
denominated debt (excluding bank debt)
9 in the last five years, and expected to be negatively related to 
RATING.  Previous research by Cantor and Packer (1996a; 1996b), Larraín et al. (1997), McNamara and 
Vaaler (2000, 2002), and Block and Vaaler (2003) show that these seven variables explain substantial 
variation in agency sovereign risk-ratings for industrialized and developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
Aside from these controls, the first independent variable related to PBC effects is whether the 
developing country held a presidential election in a current year (“ELEC”).  This is measured as a 0-1 
indicator (1 if there was an election in year t; 0 if not) and, consistent with previous research on 
opportunistic PBCs in developing countries, is expected to be negatively related to RATING (Block and 
Vaaler, 2003).  Next, we introduce a 0-1 term indicating is whether the sovereign’s incumbent 
government is right-wing (RINC) (1 if there is a right-wing incumbent at the beginning of year t; 0 
otherwise).  Consistent with partisan PBC perspectives, it is expected to be positively related to RATING.  
Finally, we introduce to Equation (8) expectations about the electoral outcome.  λD is a dummy variable, 
which is constructed to capture agency expectations of right-wing electoral victory as: 



 


= −
=
=
=
lo
mid
hi
if
if
if
D
λ λ
λ λ
λ λ
λ
1
0
1
 
Using this specification and Equation (8), we test Hypothesis 1 regarding the rough equality and 
absence of election-period rating changes as agency electoral expectations, λ, change for left-wing 
incumbents as:    
H1:  β1 + β4 ≅ β1 ≅ β1 - β4 ≅ 0.  
                                                      
8 Alternative measurement of EXTDEBT dividing external debt by exports yields results from regression analysis of Equation (8) 
consistent with those presented below using our measure of EXTDEBT.  These results are available from the authors on request. 
9 Sovereign default on bank debt is considered less severe than default on domestic- or foreign-currency bonds.  For more on 
different types of sovereign defaults, see, e.g., S&P (1999).   
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By contrast, we test Hypothesis 2 regarding differences in election-period rating changes as agency 
electoral expectations, change for right-wing incumbents as: 
H2:  β1 + β3 + β4 + β5 ≅ 0, β1 + β3 < 0, β1 + β3 - β4 - β5 < 0. 
The test of Hypothesis 3 adds additional restrictions related to the predicted hierarchy of election-period 
rating changes (downgrades) for right-wing incumbents as agency electoral expectations of right-wing 
victory at the polls dim: 
H3:  β1 + β3 + β4 + β5 > β1 + β3 > β1 + β3 - β4 - β5. 
The next three hypothesis tests compare the absolute magnitude of election-period rating changes 
for right- versus left-wing incumbents at different agency electoral expectation levels.  Using Equation 
(8), we test Hypothesis 4 and its greater absolute magnitude for right- versus left-wing rating changes 
given an agency electoral expectation of defeat as: 
H4:  β1 + β3 - β4 - β5 >β1 + β4. 
By contrast, the test of Hypothesis 5 regarding the rough equality and absence of rating changes for right- 
and left-wing incumbents expected by the agency to be re-elected is: 
H5:  β1 + β3 + β4 + β5 ≅β1 - β4 ≅ 0. 
But we test Hypothesis 6 regarding the greater absolute magnitude of election-period rating changes for 
right- compared to left-wing incumbents facing “closing call” elections as: 
H6:  β1 + β3 >β1. 
Data Sources and Sampling 
Elections.  To test the hypotheses related to risk rating agencies we collected several types of 
data.  First, we collected data on presidential elections held during the 1987-2000 period using the World 
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (“DPI”) (version 3, described in Beck et al. 2001) a database 
providing comprehensive information through 1997 on election dates, electoral systems, electoral 
competitiveness, and candidate partisan orientation.  Where the DPI database proved to be incomplete for 
certain elections held between 1998 and 2000, we turned to two alternative sources:  The International  
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Foundation for Election Systems (“IFES”) (2002); and the on-line version of the Political Reference 
Almanac 2001-2002 edition (“Polisci.com”) (2002).  Election-related information from these alternative 
sources was sampled using the same criteria as the DPI unless otherwise noted below.  From the DPI, 
IFES and Polisci.com databases, we extracted dates of presidential elections where direct popular votes or 
indirect votes of legislators or specialized electors chose chief executives judged to exert substantial 
executive governmental power rather than mere state ceremonial duties as presidential heads of state tend 
to have in parliamentary systems. 
Our decision to exclude non-presidential systems, most notably, parliamentary electoral systems, 
followed primarily from data observation and estimation issues.  Elections in countries with presidential 
systems tend to follow fixed schedules.  By contrast, executives in parliamentary systems often have 
substantial discretion in choosing the date of their re-election within an existing term in office.  This 
distinction can lead to endogeneity problems in empirical models of PBC effects.   
The DPI database also includes assessments of executive electoral competitiveness as measured 
by the extent of multi-party competition.  The measure ranges from 1 (least competitive executive 
electoral systems) to 7 (most competitive executive electoral systems).  All of the presidential elections to 
be sampled score 6 or 7 on this scale, indicating that they were “real” elections.  These DPI classifications 
of competitive elections in 1997 were judged to continue through 2000.  Using these general data sources, 
sampling approaches, and judgments, we arrived at a sample for empirical analysis consisting of 19 
countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987 to 2000.   
Partisan Orientation.  Our empirical analysis relies on identification of the partisan (left- versus 
right-wing) orientation of electoral candidates, particularly incumbent (government) candidates.  The DPI, 
IFES and Polisci.com databases provided information on the partisan orientation of candidates, including 
characterization of their parties as left-wing, right-wing, centrist- or otherwise-oriented.  Beck et al. 
(2001) explain the decision rules used for this DPI categorization.  Basically, two types of classification 
criteria were used:  content of party names; and judgments by academic and professional commentators.  
In terms of content, parties were defined as “right-wing” based on whether terms such as “conservative”  
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or “Christian democratic” were included in their names.  A “left-wing” definition followed from party 
names with terms such as “communist” or “Marxist” or “socialist” or “social democratic.”  Failing a clear 
indication based on content, academic and professional commentator judgments were used.  The 
“centrist” classification followed from no clear criteria based on party-name, thus academic and 
professional judgment was the primary source.  Centrist parties advocated the strengthening of private 
enterprise but also supported some substantial redistributive role for government.  Parties were placed in a 
fourth classification as “other” if both name-based and commentator-based criteria could not clearly 
classify them into left-wing, right-wing, or centrist-orientations.  Using IFES and Polisci.com databases, 
we applied the same criteria to ascertain preliminary classifications for post-1997 elections not covered by 
DPI. 
Noting the increased subjectivity associated with the centrist classification, as well as the 
similarities of central propositions in economic policy between centrist and right-wing governments, we 
chose to collapse centrist parties into the right-wing classification; thus, our final classifications are 
limited to two:  left-wing and right-wing (including centrist).  Where an incumbent party in our sample 
was classified as “other” by the DPI—and there were only three such instances—we consulted IFES and 
Polisci.com for additional information on which to make a judgment of left- versus right-wing party 
orientation.
10 
Electoral Expectations.  In addition to electoral system and partisan classifications, our 
conceptual framework, hypotheses, and empirical model contemplate measurement of expectations of 
electoral victory by agencies.  As noted earlier, we use the final electoral polling results to gauge 
retrospectively agency and bondholder expectations.  DPI, IFES, Polisci.com and other sources
11 provided 
the basis for these data.  We noted the final poll victor and the final margin of victory for each election in 
our sample.  The victory margin was defined as the difference in percentage points between the winning 
                                                      
10 Regression analysis results excluding observations we re-classified from “other” are completely consistent with those reported 
below, and are available from the authors on request. 
11 These other sources included government web sites of countries considered for inclusion in our sample.  
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and second-place (runner-up) candidates.  We use the margin of victory to attribute a λ measurement to 
each election:  1) 
lo λ λ =  for subjective expectation of left-wing victory; 2) 
hi λ λ = for subjective 
expectation of right-wing victory; and 3) 
med λ λ = for a “close call” subjective expectation.  Elections fell 
into this third classification when the victory margin was less than 3% at the final poll, regardless of the 
victor’s partisan orientation.
 12 
Macroeconomic Controls.  For the seven macroeconomic control variables in Equation (8), we 
collected annual data from 1986 to 2000 using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (“WDI”) 
(World Bank 2002), and from Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P, 1999, 2002), which provided 
information on defaults on US-dollar denominated sovereign bond issues during the period of study.   
Agencies and Ratings.  Bloomberg International (2002) on-line sources provided information on 
the six major agencies rating sovereigns at various times from 1987-2000.
13  For each year, the published 
agency rating on December 31 of that year, was measured on a 17-point (0-16) scale.  Ratings in our final 
sample ranged from 0 to 13 on the numerical scale described above, and exhibited a mean of 5.5 
(approximately 6 = BB+, the highest “junk” rating) and standard deviation of 2.9.  Since ratings in our 
sample tend to be near the cut-off between junk and investment grade, even small changes –one or two 
rating levels-- can have important practical effects.  For example, certain institutional investors may face 
regulatory restrictions on the percentage of non-investment grade debt in their portfolios.  When ratings 
on issuers fall from investment to junk grade, their cost of debt typically increases substantially (Cantor 
and Packer, 1996a, b).  Our final ratings sample comprised 482 annual ratings observations published by 
                                                      
12 Changing the definition of “close call” election to victory margins of less than 5% or 10% does not change the signs observed 
on coefficient estimates reported below; however it does lessen the statistical significance of these estimates.  Results using these 
alternative measures are available from the authors on request. 
13 Those major agencies are:  1) Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Company (“DCR”); 2) Fitch Investor Services (“Fitch”); 3) 
Thomson Bank Watch (“Thomson”); 4) International Bank Credit Analysis (“IBCA”); 5) Moody’s Investor Service 
(“Moody’s”); and 6) Standards & Poor’s Ratings Services (“S&P”).  These agencies all enjoyed designation by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”).  Various SEC regulations 
(e.g., Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Advisors Act of 1940) require issuers to obtain ratings from one, more often two 
NRSROs before they can place their debt securities with institutional investors.  For more on NRSRO status, see, e.g., Hunt 
(2002).  Or these major agencies, in 1987 only Moody’s and S&P were actively engaged in rating developing country sovereigns.  
By 1994, all six agencies were publishing developing country sovereign ratings.  From 1997-2000, however, the industry went 
through consolidation with Fitch merging or acquiring DCR, IBCA and Thomson to become the “third” agency in this and other 
rating businesses.  For more on the changing industrial organization of rating agencies, see, e.g., White (2001).  
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the major agencies for sovereigns from 19 developing countries holding 39 presidential elections from 
1987-2000.
14  Of these 482 ratings, 108 covered election years.  
Estimation Strategy 
Previous empirical research on sovereign risk-rating estimation suggests different approaches for 
estimating Equation (8).  Ordinary least squares regression provided the earliest approach (e.g., Horrigan  
1966; Cantor and Packer  1996a; 1996b), but n-level ordered logit or probit approaches are more 
appropriate given the ordinal nature of ratings (Zavoina and McElvey 1975).  In practice, these different 
estimation approaches yield similar results when there are several levels in the ordinal scale.  Our sample 
of ratings covers 13 of the possible 17 ordinal levels.  Even so, we estimate the ratings based on ordered 
probit regression with additional adjustments to correct for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
clustering.
15 
As checks on the robustness of our results, we re-estimate Equation (8) with two modifications. 
Following research by Alesina et al. (1997) and others, we noted that many PBC-related behaviors 
anticipating elections early in year t, may in fact occur substantially in year t-1.  To address that 
possibility, we reviewed our sample for ratings observations for country-years with elections occurring in 
the first quarter of year t.  We identified three such “early election” observations, and replaced each in 
with the previous year’s (RATINGrit-1) rating observation.   
A second modification related to the timing of agency ratings during election years.  Our 
conceptual framework contemplates agency rating change decisions taken in advance of election-day, 
which could occur throughout year; however, our election year rating observations are consistently taken 
                                                      
14 One of the major agencies, Fitch, published only one sovereign rating and did not appear to pursue any sovereign rating 
business prior to 1997 when it acquired IBCA.  We therefore dropped the one pre-1997 Fitch observation, leaving only five 
different agencies in our sample. 
15 Note from the subscripts in Equation (8) that, in some cases, the data set permits multiple agency ratings for the same country 
in a given year.  The cross-section in our sample is, therefore, defined as unique combinations of agency and country, e.g., 
Moody’s-Argentina, S&P-Argentina.  Accordingly, we use robust Huber/White/sandwich standard error estimators.  Multiple 
agencies rating the same country in a given year mean that in several years, the right-hand side data for that country in that year 
are identical.  If uncorrected, this type of clustering could result in biased standard errors that could exaggerate statistical 
significance.  An additional adjustment related to this clustering issue assumes independence between but not within unique 
country-year combinations.  
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on December 31 of each year.  In most cases, this inconsistency is not problematic.  95 of the 108 
election-year rating observations show no change from at least one month (and usually several months) 
before election day to December 31 of that same year.  But 13 election-year ratings observed on 
December 31 had changed close to the election. Six changed in the month of the election; seven changed 
in the month after the election.  These “late” rating changes were not randomly distributed:  Eight of these 
observations came from Korea and Chile; all were for elections with right-wing incumbents.  Rather than 
drop them from the sample, we retained them but include an additional control, postELECchange, that 
takes the value of 1 for these 13 observations, otherwise 0.
 
5.  Results 
Table 2 reports descriptive (Columns 1-2) and regression analysis results from ordered probit 
estimation (Columns 3-6) using some or all of the terms in Equation (8).  Columns 3-6 of Table 2 provide 
progressively more complex model results, including a “base case” analysis of macroeconomic and 
related factors only (Column 3), one with both these controls and a simple election-year effect term 
(Column 4), and two full models including the previously described terms as well as various partisan 
orientation and electoral expectation terms (Columns 5-6).  To test our six hypotheses, we rely primarily 
on results from the full model in Column 5.  Full model results in Column 6, which include modifications 
for both “early” elections, and “late” rating changes, are displayed primarily for robustness purposes.  
Consistent with Equation (8), all four regressions also include country, year and agency indicator variable 
estimates omitted from Table 2 to simplify exposition of central results.  
Overall, results from our analyses provide substantial support for our conceptual framework of 
agency decision-making based on partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations.  To show how, we 
report the results from the simplest (Column 3) to most complex specifications (Columns 5-6). 
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TABLE 2 
Ordered Probit Regression Results 
Dependent Variable:  Agency Long Term Foreign Currency Sovereign Risk Ratings, 1987–2000 
a 
 
Estimator → 
 
Coefficient ↓ 
(1) 
 
Mean 
(2) 
 
Std.  Dev. 
(3) 
Ordered 
Probit 
(4) 
Ordered 
Probit
 
(5) 
Ordered 
Probit 
(6) 
b 
Ordered 
Probit 
EXTBAL [ψ1]  -0.5740 5.1653  -0.0771*** 
(0.0215) 
-0.0825*** 
(0.0212) 
-0.0818*** 
(0.0238) 
-0.0870*** 
(0.0281) 
EXTDEBT [ψ2]  0.4097 0.1740  -8.5304*** 
(0.9689) 
-8.6179*** 
(0.9941) 
-9.1010*** 
(1.0082) 
-8.4051*** 
(0.8277) 
PC I [ψ3]  4013.907 2604.7430  -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
GDPG [ψ4]  1.7606 3.4248  0.0307 
(0.0202) 
0.0292 
(0.0196) 
0.0269 
(0.0190) 
0.0411** 
(0.0174) 
INFL [ψ5]  77.0836 301.5471  -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
FISC BAL [ψ6]  -1.7667 2.8896  0.0107 
(0.0356) 
0.0062 
(0.0420) 
0.0024 
(0.0416) 
0.0030 
(0.0458) 
DEF [ψ7]  0.5518 0.4978  -1.2880*** 
(0.2538) 
-1.3404*** 
(0.2630) 
-1.4120*** 
(0.2610) 
-1.3877*** 
(0.2770) 
ELEC [β1]  0.2261 0.4187    -0.3520*** 
(0.1180) 
-0.3506 
(0.2427) 
-0.2133 
(0.1569) 
RINC [β2]  0.7157 0.4515      0.5354* 
(0.2978) 
0.5212 
(0.3587) 
RINC*ELEC [β3]         -0.1224 
(0.1516) 
-0.2184* 
(0.1271) 
ELEC*λD [β4]         0.2631 
(0.1628) 
0.3506** 
(0.1647) 
RINC*ELEC*λD 
[β5]         -0.0129 
(0.2826) 
-0.1273 
(0.1191) 
postELECchange 
[β10]          -0.9879 
(0.7551) 
N
  482 482  475  475  475  475 
Pseudo R
2     0.3662  0.3697  0.3720  0.3765 
β1 + β4: Left inc., 
right expected (λ
hi) 
       -0.0876 
(0.3381) 
0.1373 
(0.1886) 
β1: Left inc.,  
close call (λ
med) 
       -0.3506 
(0.2427) 
-0.2133 
(0.1569) 
β1 - β4: Left inc., left 
expected (λ
lo) 
       -0.6137*** 
(0.2377) 
-0.5638** 
(0.2607) 
β1 + β3 + β4 + β5: 
Right inc., right 
expected (λ
hi) 
      
 
-0.2229 
(0.1534) 
 
-0.2084 
(0.1648) 
β1 + β3: Right inc., 
close call (λ
med) 
       -0.4730*** 
(0.1491) 
-0.5176** 
(0.2186) 
β1 + β3 - β4 - β5: 
Right inc., left 
expected (λ
lo) 
      
 
-0.7232** 
(0.3411) 
 
-0.6549*** 
(0.2539) 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a. Countries in sample include:  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  39 presidential elections covered by 
ratings from up to five NRSRO agencies are included in this sample from the 1987-2000 period.  Not reported are estimates for country, 
year and agency dummies included in each specification.  Includes robust standard errors with adjustments for ratings clustering on 
agencies.  Results from re-estimation of “close call” as 5% and 10% margin of victory are consistent with results shown above. These 
additional results are available from the authors on request.  
b. Dependent variable for elections held in first quarter of year t is agency rating published on December 31 of year t-1.  Includes 
indicator variable (postELECchange) taking value 1 for agency ratings published on December 31 that were announced within a month 
before or after election, otherwise 0.   
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The base case results in Column 3 generally confirm previous research by Cantor and Packer 
(1996a,b), who demonstrated with cross-sectional data, and McNamara and Vaaler (2000) as well as 
Block and Vaaler (2003), who demonstrated with panel data that these seven macroeconomic and related 
variables closely approximate the rating algorithm commonly employed by the major agencies.  Four of 
the seven terms are statistically significant at p < 0.01; 
 among those four, all but the coefficient on 
external balance (EXTBAL) display the expected sign.  In general, the base model’s results are intuitively 
plausible.  Agencies accord higher ratings to countries with smaller external debt ratios, lower inflation, 
and no recent history of default on sovereign bonds. 
Column 4 expands on the base case by introducing the simple election-period term (ELEC) with 
virtually no impact on the previously included coefficient estimates.  This estimation reproduces 
effectively Block and Vaaler’s (2003) test of opportunistic business cycles.  The coefficient is, as 
expected, significant and negative ( 3520 . 0 ˆ
1 − = β ; p < 0.01), thus, confirming their previous finding that 
election years are associated with lower credit ratings. 
Columns 5–6 present the full model results.  Column 5’s introduction of an indicator for the right-
wing incumbency of a government in a given year (RINC) is positive ( 5354 . 0 ˆ
2 = β ; p < 0.10) but turns 
negative (though not significant at commonly acceptable levels) when interacted with the election year 
dummy (RINC*ELECT).  The signs are robust to the modifications included in Column 6 though the 
negative interaction term is now significant ( 2184 . 0 ˆ
3 − = β ; p < 0.10) while the positive individual right-
wing incumbency term is not.  These results are consistent with the assumption that right-wing 
incumbency is generally viewed positively by the inflation-conscious agencies; however, election years 
bring the possibility of right-wing ouster, which would explain the negative sign on the right-wing 
incumbency and election year interaction term.    
Other results in Column 5 provide additional insight on election-year ratings, but with more 
specific application to PBC considerations analyzed in our conceptual framework.  When election-year 
rating effects are partitioned based on different agency expectations of right-wing victory on election-day  
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(λD), we derive coefficient estimates sufficient to test our six hypotheses.  The slope coefficients for each 
of the six different cells in Table 1 appear at the bottom of Table 2.   
Recall first that, based on these Table 1 cells, we predicted in Hypothesis 1 that there would be no 
significant difference from zero in the slopes for left-wing incumbents no matter the agency electoral 
expectation.  Our results suggest partial support:  At two of the three electoral expectation levels (λ
hi and 
λ
med) the slope coefficient slopes are not significantly different from zero; but, interestingly, when agency 
electoral expectations are that the left-wing incumbents will be re-elected (λ
lo), the resulting slope is 
significantly negative rather than zero.  Holding other terms in Equation (8) at their mean levels, ratings 
fall by approximately one ordinal rating level for developing countries with left-wing incumbents likely to 
be retained by voters in election years.   
This apparent inconsistency might be explained first by the approximate measurement of agency 
electoral expectations.  Rather than complete certainty (λ = 0), implying a clear “no change” (0,0) decision, 
we are measuring a range of likely (but not necessarily certain) re-election expectations.  Thus, practically, 
the agency’s decision rule in the context of likely re-election includes both partisan PBC considerations 
tending toward upgrade (+) and opportunistic considerations tending toward downgrade (-).  Given this, one 
interpretation suggests that partisan and opportunistic tendencies generally counteract one another in 
scenarios where left-wing incumbents face a close call election or likely ouster; in cases of re-election, 
however, opportunistic PBC considerations may predominate, thereby inclining the agency to downgrade.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 rely on the reinforcing (not counteracting) impact of partisan and 
opportunistic PBC considerations for right-wing incumbents at different electoral expectation levels.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find in Column 5 that agency expectations of right-wing re-election (λ
hi) 
are associated with a ratings change slope not significantly different from zero, but that agency 
expectations of either a close call or likely ouster by left-wing challenger lead to significantly negative 
ratings change slopes:  In a close call election (λ
hi ), the impact on election-period ratings for right-wing 
incumbents is -0.4730 (p < 0.01); in an election where agencies expect the right-wing incumbent to lose  
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(λ
lo), the ratings change slope is -0.7232 (p < 0.01).  As Column 6 demonstrates, these results are robust to 
modifications for early elections and late rating changes.   
The sign and size of these estimates also support Hypothesis 3, which predicted an orderly 
hierarchy of ratings changes with right-wing incumbents:  Likely re-election (λ
hi) would yield the least 
negative change; close call election expectations would be second (λ
med); and the likely ouster of a right-
wing incumbent would result in the greatest negative ratings change (λ
lo).  Interestingly, however, these 
three different slope coefficients are not different from each other at commonly acceptable levels of 
statistical significance, either in Column 5 or in the modified estimation in Column 6.  Thus, we have the 
interesting scenario where signs and the absolute coefficient values are aligned consistently with 
Hypothesis 3.  The practical effects of moving from the highest (λ
hi) to the lowest (λ
lo) point on the 
hierarchy indicates additional support, though a formal statistical test of differences between these points 
does not provide additional confirmation.   
Hypotheses 4-6 test differences in the absolute magnitude of ratings change effects across 
partisan orientations at fixed electoral expectation levels. We find statistically significant support (p < 
0.10) for Hypothesis 4 predicting that the absolute magnitude of ratings changes for right-wing 
incumbents likely to ousted from office (λ
lo) (0.7232) will be greater than for left-wing incumbents 
expected to be turned out (λ
hi) (0.0876).  This result is robust to modified re-estimation in Column 6, and 
provides additional confirmation of our assumption of reinforcing (for right-wing incumbents) but 
counteracting (for left-wing incumbents) partisan and opportunistic PBC effects on ratings changes.   
Holding all other effects on ratings at their mean values, the results in Column 6 (our fully 
modified model) also suggest that agencies will downgrade by one discrete rating level countries where a 
right-wing incumbent faces election with a high likelihood of losing to a left-wing challenger (such as 
recently occurred in Brazil).  Given the mean rating in our sample (5.5 ≅ BB+), even a downgrade of one 
notch could be sufficient to prevent a country with an otherwise improving risk profile (based on, say, 
improved macroeconomic indicators) from moving out of “junk” and into the investment grade ranks (7 = 
BBB or greater) so important for placing debt with institutional investors on reasonable terms.  In  
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contrast, the model predicts no discrete change in rating when a left-wing incumbent faces likely defeat 
by a right-wing challenger.  Again, the upgrade tendency such a change might prompt given partisan PBC 
considerations, could be counteracted by a downgrade tendency due to the opportunistic PBC fear that the 
incumbent “against the wall” will engage in a spending spree to avoid defeat.  The overall result is no 
significant change in election-period rating. 
Results for Hypotheses 5 and 6 differ from those for Hypothesis 4 described immediately above.  
Recall that, in the case of likely re-election of right- (λ
hi) and left-wing (λ
lo) incumbents we predict in 
Hypothesis 5 rough equivalence and no significant differences from zero.  Looking at Column 5, we do, 
in fact, find rough equivalence (i.e., no statistically significant difference) in the absolute magnitude of 
ratings changes for right-wing (0.2229) versus left-wing (0.6137) incumbents; yet, only right-wing (not 
left-wing) ratings changes here are insignificant relative to zero.  Similarly, only partial support is 
indicated for Hypothesis 6, which predicts greater absolute magnitude of ratings change for right-wing 
versus left-wing incumbents facing close call elections (λ
med).  Indeed, the absolute coefficient value for 
right-wing incumbent ratings change slope (0.4730) is greater than for left-wing incumbents (0.3506), but 
the difference between these two is not significant at commonly acceptable levels.  Taken together, these 
results suggest that cross-partisan differences in election-period ratings become significant only in cases 
where incumbents have their “backs against the wall.” The reinforcing (for right-wing incumbents) and 
counteracting (for left-wing incumbents) effects of partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations are less 
pronounced between partisans as the likelihood of re-election improves. 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
Formal theories of political business cycles are typically categorized as being either partisan or 
opportunistic based on their assumptions regarding the characteristics of incumbents and voters.  Both 
branches of theory have found only mixed empirical support, with the strongest evidence coming from 
applications of opportunistic theories to developing countries.  The present study takes as given both 
types of PBC theories and addresses their joint implications for the behavior of private, foreign-based  
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financial actors whose interests may be at stake in developing countries.  In particular, we develop an 
analytical framework that incorporates both partisan and opportunistic considerations into the decision 
rule that agencies follow as they assess election-related risks to sovereign credit in developing countries. 
Specifically, we posit that agencies act as if they are aware of the potential for incumbent 
politicians to initiate and sustain different (and more or less favorable) economic policies based on 
partisan preferences.  We find firm support for the broad proposition that risk assessments by agencies are 
conditioned on the partisan orientation of the incumbent government, as well as by expectations of the 
election’s outcome.  These findings build on and incorporate previous findings by Block and Vaaler 
(2003) that agencies also act out of concern for pre-election opportunistic behavior by incumbents.   
Holding constant a set of macroeconomic control variables thought to explain sovereign ratings, we find a 
decline (increase) of approximately one agency rating level due to unfavorable expected changes in 
partisan orientation.  We also find evidence that the extent of these rating change tendencies are greater 
for right- versus left-wing incumbents, a consequence of the reinforcing rather than counteracting effects 
of partisan and opportunistic PBC effects in the case of right-wing incumbents.  These results are robust 
to the inclusion of year, country, and agency effects, as well as to changes in the sample and specification 
used.   
Our findings raise several broader questions about electoral partisanship and opportunism, and 
the apparent price they may entail for developing countries.  Sovereign ratings are increasingly important 
to developing countries seeking to finance growth by attracting mobile investment capital in a global 
economy.  Downgrades portend substantial increases in the cost of capital, and perhaps, other negative 
reactions such as reduced capital inflows, and in extreme cases, even capital outflows (see, e.g., Larraín et 
al. 1997).  If incumbent political leaders in developing countries are prone to creating partisan business 
cycles—as a growing literature suggests they are—and if outside observers such as agencies are aware of 
that potential, then partisanship might have effects on the development of countries more than had been 
previously assumed.  Our findings suggest that partisan aspects of economic programs in developing  
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countries may lead to more negative agency risk assessments, which lenders and investors will use to 
demand higher returns on capital they may send there in the short- to medium-term.   
These costs have been under-emphasized if not completely ignored in the PBC literature.  In an 
era of financial globalization, such costs may be substantial, particularly as competitive elections 
involving candidates with distinct partisan orientations and policies become increasingly frequent events 
among nascent democracies in the developing world.  For example, agency concerns and rating 
downgrades made in anticipation of a partisan shift from right- to left-wing in Brazil’s presidency during 
the 2002 election period may contribute to greater overall investor anxiety, increased spreads on 
sovereign debt instruments, even lower bank-lending limits.  These developments could, in turn, frustrate 
the implementation of economic and social policies championed by the incoming president and his party. 
This research invites further exploration of related PBC issues.  As our conjecture above suggests, 
partisan concerns of other relevant third parties and their perceptions of changed risk promise additional 
interesting insight.  Goldsmith’s (1994) findings seem validated in this study with respect to agencies, a 
key player in international capital markets.  Other key individuals may be similarly affected by elections, 
including banks making loans, individuals and institutions trading bonds or managing investment 
portfolios, and firms engaged in foreign direct investment in developing countries.  Deeper understanding 
of the composition of such fluctuations before and after elections will also contribute to future PBC-
related research.  
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